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Abstract 
 
■ The impact of corporate governance on export decisions is an important yet under- 
explored research issue. This paper examines this issue with respect to Chinese listed 
firms. We adopt an analytical framework in which the effects of corporate governance 
on export decisions are associated with institutional environment. We test several 
hypotheses derived from this framework. 
 
Key Results 
 
■ The sample firm’s export propensity and export intensity are found to be positively 
impacted by CEO ownership share and independent director ratio, and negatively 
impacted by private/family control. 
 
■ The export-promoting effects of CEO ownership share and independent director ratio 
are found to be positively moderated by a well-established institutional environment.  
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The Effects of Corporate Governance and Institutional Environments on 
Export Behaviour: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Corporate governance has attracted research attention in a wide variety of disciplines. 
In the field of management, research on corporate governance has grown rapidly and is 
considered of great potential (Daily et al. 2003, Williamson 1999). Despite the rapid growth 
of the literature on corporate governance, there has been relatively little work on how 
corporate governance impacts upon firms’ internationalisation decisions. Among the few 
exceptions, Filatotchev/Dyomina/Wright/Buck (2001) investigated the effects of corporate 
governance on the export decisions of firms in transition economies within the former 
Soviet Union (FSU), while Filatotchev/Strange/Piesse/Lien (2007) studied the effects of 
corporate governance on the foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions of firms in newly 
industrialized economies. The findings of these studies highlight the important role of 
corporate governance in the internationalisation decisions of firms in transition economies 
and newly industrialized economies. 
  
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance factors on export decisions 
using a sample of 779 manufacturing firms listed on China’s stock markets for the period of 
2002-2005. China provides an excellent opportunity for an investigation into the impact of 
corporate governance and institutions on the export decisions of firms in emerging markets. 
First, with China’s WTO entry in 2001, Chinese firms have entered a new era of 
international competition. Our sample period corresponds to this post-WTO period in 
which internationalisation has become an important strategic consideration on the agenda of 
many Chinese companies. Second, China has adopted corporate governance concepts from 
the U.S. and other developed economies during its reform process. However, the 
effectiveness of these borrowed “best practices”, especially their effects on firm export 
behaviour, has not been fully studied (Clarke 2006). Third, the gradual reform process in 
China has created uneven institutional environments across its different regions. In 
emerging economies, institutions play a pivotal role in firms’ strategic decisions (Hoskisson 
et al. 2000, Wright et al. 2005). However, studies about the effects of institutions on the 
internationalisation decisions of firms are relatively limited. In particular, there is a lack of 
research into the moderating effect of institutional environments on corporate governance 
in terms of internationalisation strategies in the context of emerging economies. 
 
Our paper makes a number of contributions. First, we develop several hypotheses that 
look into how various corporate governance factors affect export decisions and 
performance. Specifically, we examine the impact of CEO equity ownership, board 
composition and ownership structure on the internationalisation of firms in an emerging 
economy. By incorporating a wide range of corporate governance factors into our study, we 
are able to provide a better understanding of the links between the detailed characters of 
corporate governance and internationalisation.  
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Second, we examine the role of corporate governance in export behaviour in the broad 
context of China’s marketisation and privatisation. This distinguishes our research from 
existing studies by putting an emphasis on how dynamic changes in institutional 
environment moderate the effectiveness of corporate governance in an emerging economy. 
In addition, our study within the context of emerging economies provides a different 
perspective from those in developed countries, which generates useful contributions to the 
international business literature (Filatotchev et al. 2001). Hence, by studying the impact of 
corporate governance on the export decisions of Chinese firms located in regions with 
different institutional environments, we contribute to the literature by improving our 
understanding of, and gaining new insights into, how corporate governance interacts with 
institutional development in influencing the export decisions of firms.  
 
 
Literature and Hypotheses 
 
Export Behaviour 
 
Exporting is an important activity and often the first stage of internationalisation for 
firms from emerging economies (Pan/Tse 2000). Exporting is also an important channel to 
improve firm innovation and productivity (Liu/Buck 2007, Wei/Liu 2006). Exporting plays 
crucial roles in the world economy. According to the World Trade Report, world 
merchandise exports in 2006 rose by 15.4 per cent to $11.76 trillion, while China’s 
merchandise export expansion remained outstandingly strong. For Chinese firms, exporting 
has been the most important internationalisation decision as administrative controls on 
overseas direct investment by Chinese firms have only recently been relaxed (Buckley et al. 
2007). 
 
Despite its importance for firm growth, exporting is a relatively rare firm activity. 
Bernard et al. (2007) found that of the 5.5 million firms operating in the United States in 
2000, just 4 percent engaged in exporting. Similar patterns were also found in France 
(Eaton et al. 2004) and in Colombia (Eaton et al. 2007). In addition to its rarity, exporting 
was found to be a self-selection process, where exporters were found to be larger, more 
productive, more skill-intensive and capital-intensive compared with non-exporting firms 
(Bernard et al. 2007). These findings suggest that exporting is a risky and 
resource-demanding strategic decision. 
  
There are numerous studies on the determination of firm export behaviour in both  
international economics literature and international business literature. While economists 
emphasize macro-level elements, and have investigated factors including comparative 
advantage, government policies, exchange rate fluctuations, and domestic market 
characteristics (Hummels/Klenow 2005, Sakakibara/Porter 2001), international business 
researchers focus on micro-level factors, and have provided evidence from the 
resource-based view (Aulakh et al. 2000) and agency theory (Filatotchev et al. 2001). 
  
It is only recently that researchers have started to pay attention to the role of corporate 
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governance in export behaviour (Filatotchev et al. 2001). While it has become the norm in 
Western literature to adopt agency theory as an appropriate lens for the analysis of 
corporate governance, theories derived from developed countries may face challenges when 
applying them to emerging economies (Hoskisson et al. 2000, Wright et al. 2005). In such 
theories, institutions are often assumed as “background” and taken for granted (Peng et al. 
2008). In emerging economies, however, institutional factors were found to have 
considerable explanatory power and should be taken into account (Hoskisson et al. 2000, 
Wright et al. 2005). Hence, agency theory plus the resource-based view is not adequate to 
examine firms’ export behaviour in an emerging economy as these perspectives ignore the 
social contact and institutional environments within which firms’ activities and behaviour 
are embedded. In this study, we follow the literature to consider both the internal and 
external determinants of the export behaviour of firms, while placing our research focus on 
the effects of corporate governance in connection with institutional changes. We embrace 
an integrated framework by incorporating agency theory and institutional theory. 
Combining these various perspectives yields a richer and more composite understanding of 
the impact of both internal factors and external institutional environments on export 
behaviour.     
   
Corporate Governance and Export Behaviour 
 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled, 
and centres around the relationships between stockholders, the board of directors, and 
management (Clarke 2006). According to agency theory, the separation of corporate 
ownership and control may cause managers to avoid some value-enhancing but risky 
projects in order to preserve their private benefits (Hirshleifer/Thakor 1992, 
Holmstrom/Costa 1986). To solve the problem of managers’ self-interested risk aversion, 
the literature suggests that different forms of CEO compensation should be designed to 
reward or encourage risk-taking decisions that may benefit stockholders. In particular, CEO 
equity ownership is considered to be an ideal instrument which aligns the interests of CEO 
with that of stockholders, and helps overcome the problem of ‘shortsightedness’ as CEOs 
will still be eligible to future gains from their companies’ share price rises even if their 
tenure terminates (Sanders/Hambrick 2007). Empirical evidence shows that CEO equity 
ownership has a positive effect on management risk-taking behaviour (Eisenmann 2002, 
Esty 1997, Zahra 1996). Given that exporting is a risk-taking decision aiming for long-term 
growth, we establish the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: Firms with higher CEO equity ownership are more likely to become exporters and 
have higher export intensity. 
 
According to agency theory, the board of directors is considered an essential internal 
governance mechanism which monitors executives and eliminates agency problems. The 
role of independent directors and the relative proportion of independent directors in 
decision making has been extensively studied (Denis/McConnell 2003). A consistent 
finding with regard to the role of independent directors in corporate governance in 
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developed economies indicates that a higher proportion of independent directors associates 
with better strategic decisions concerning such issues as acquisitions, executive 
compensation, and CEO turnover (Hermalin/Weisbach 2003). According to the 
resource-based view, independent directors play service and resource acquisition roles in 
firms besides monitoring executives (Peng et al. 2008). It has been found that the education 
and experience of independent directors may lead them to have concerns about long-term 
development strategies such as internationalisation (Tihanyi et al. 2003) and R&D 
investment (Kor 2006).  
 
The agency theory predicts that an effective board of directors can protect the interests 
of shareholders by monitoring critical decisions made by a firm’s executives, while the 
resource-based view predicts that independent directors improve executives’ ability to 
pursue risky long-term development strategies by contributing experience and resources. To 
test whether these predictions apply to export decisions of Chinese firms, we hypothesise:  
  
H1b: Firms with a higher ratio of independent directors are more likely to become 
exporters and have higher export intensity. 
 
Recently, attention has been paid to the relationship between ownership structure and 
export behaviour (Fernández/Nieto 2006, Filatotchev et al. 2001). Consistent with the 
resource-based view, private/family controlled firms in developed economies are less likely 
to export due to limited access to key resources and the lack of capabilities needed for 
exporting (Fernández/Nieto 2006). For firms in newly industrialised economies, research 
findings also supported the resource-based view, indicating that that family ownership is 
negatively related to the possibility and extent of FDI (Filatotchev et al. 2007). Privatisation 
which occurred in transition economies such as the FSU, provides an important opportunity 
to improve our understanding of the relationship between ownership structure and export 
behaviour (Filatotchev et al. 2001). Unlike in the FSU, the privatisation process in China is 
more gradual and selective and the state continues to maintain control in large and listed 
firms after decades of reform (Bai et al. 2006a). It was only in recent years that some family 
firms or individuals have become the ultimate controller of Chinese listed firms through 
corporation pyramid and cross-shareholding (Fan et al. 2007). The coexistence of 
government/state and private/family firms in China provides an ideal setting to test the 
impact of ownership structure on export decisions. Considering that Chinese private/family 
firms are still relatively small and face resource and capability constraints (Bai et al. 2006b), 
we hypothesise: 
  
H1c: Private/family controlled firms are less likely to become exporters, and are more 
likely to have lower export intensity.  
 
Privatisation was designed to eliminate constraints on managerial strategies imposed 
by state ownership (Filatotchev et al. 2001). A major constraint in state-controlled firms is 
that government/state ownership makes companies less effective in resolving agency 
problems. Executives in state-controlled firms have less incentive to pursue long-run 
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growth (Groves et al. 1994). Governments have an incentive to use their controlling rights 
to channel benefits away from the firm (Shleifer 1998). In contrast to state-controlled firms, 
private ownership in private/family firms helps to reduce agency costs by aligning 
management incentives and owner incentives (Fama/Jensen 1983). In addition, underlying 
dimensions of “familiness” (e.g. goal congruence, trust) assist family firms in reducing 
monitoring costs and enable them to perform better (Lubatkin et al. 2005, Anderson/Reeb 
2003). 
 
In a study of international expansion of U.S. manufacturing family firms, Zahra (2003) 
found that internationalisation is significantly and positively associated with the interaction 
of family ownership and family involvement. Examining exporting strategies of a sample 
of family and non-family firms in Spain, Fernández/Nieto (2006) found that the presence of 
a corporate blockholder in family firms encourages exporting. These findings reveal that 
ownership structure not only directly affects internationalisation decisions, but also 
indirectly by moderating the effects of other corporate governance variables. In this paper, 
we examine the moderating effect of family/private control on how CEO equity ownership 
and independent directors impact export decisions, and we hypothesise: 
 
H1d: Private/family control positively moderates the impact of CEO equity ownership and 
independent directors on export behaviour. 
 
Institutional Environments and Export Behaviour 
 
Recent literature emphasises the importance of institutions on firms’ strategic choices 
in emerging economies, and significantly expands our understanding of the strategic 
behaviour of firms in emerging markets (Hoskisson et al. 2000, Wright et al. 2005). Known 
as the “rules of the game” (North 1990), institutions directly determine what arrows a firm 
has in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy and to create 
competitive advantage (Ingram/Silverman 2002). Some studies reveal that institutions are 
important determinants of firms’ investment behaviour (Cull/Xu 2005), performance 
(Peng/Luo 2000), and diversification (Wan 2005).  
 
In the literature of internationalisation, earlier studies focused on how institutional 
environments in emerging economies affect the strategic decisions of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) from developed economies, such as location and partner choices 
(Delios/Henisz 2000, Isobe et al. 2000). Recently, increasing attention has been paid to how 
home country institutional environments affect the internationalisation strategies and 
performance of firms from emerging economies (Hitt et al. 2006, Wan/Hoskisson 2003) 
.  
As in other emerging economies such as Vietnam (Meyer/Nguyen 2005), the 
development of institutions, especially informal institutions, is uneven across different 
regions within China (Wen 2007). In a paper focused on the determinants of Chinese 
outward FDI, Buckley et al. (2007) found that a strong home institutional environment 
helped emerging country firms to offset ownership and location disadvantages abroad. 
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During the reform process in China, differences in institutional environments across regions 
were reflected in various dimensions of marketisation. Firms located in regions with higher 
levels of marketisation have better access to key resources and institutional support for 
internationalisation activities. Thus, we hypothesise: 
 
H2a: Firms located in regions with higher levels of marketisation are more likely to become 
exporters and have higher export intensity. 
 
Recent corporate governance research in finance literature found that different legal 
systems have significant impact on the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance 
(Denis/McConnell 2003). For example, Doidg et al. (2007) found that country 
characteristics explain a large percentage of the variance in corporate governance quality at 
firm level (ranging from 39% to 73%) for a sample of 25 countries. Similarly, some 
management studies show that, unlike in developed economies, the institutional context in 
emerging economies makes the enforcement of agency contracts more costly and 
problematic (Wright et al. 2005). In studying the moderating effect of home country 
institutional environments, Wan/Hoskisson (2003) found that intense competition forces 
firms to develop and sustain competition advantages, and hence, the common negative 
effect of overdiversification on firm performance is less serious for firms with stronger 
home country institutional environments. In summary, both finance and management 
research suggests that the institutional environment not only affects firm strategic decisions 
directly, but also indirectly through affecting corporate governance. 
 
In transition economies, institutional constraints determine the effectiveness of the 
impact of improved corporate governance on firms’ export decisions. As a major theme in 
corporate governance, independent directors and CEO equity ownership mechanisms are 
there to help shareholders solve agency problems. However, the role of independent 
directors in transition economies may be questionable as those independent directors are 
not always really independent (Peng et al. 2008). Prior studies failed to find positive links 
between the proportion of independent directors and financial performance of firms in 
China and Russia (Peng 2004, Peng et al. 2003), which may be explained by the lack of 
necessary institutional arrangements for independent directors to play an effective role 
(Clarke 2006). Institutional constraints are also found to limit the effective application of 
the CEO equity ownership mechanism in transition economies like China (Firth, et al. 
2007). In an overview of China’s corporate governance, Clarke (2003) concluded that the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance system in China depends critically on the 
presence of other institutions. Recognizing the uneven development of institutions across 
Chinese regions, we expect that the hypothesised effects of CEO ownership share and 
independent director ratio on export behaviour (H1a and H1b) depend positively on the 
institutional environment within which the firm operates. Thus, we hypothesise: 
 
H2b: The level of marketisation positively moderates the impact of CEO equity ownership 
and independent directors on export behaviour. 
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Data and Variables 
 
Sample 
 
Our study uses a unique dataset on China’s listed manufacturing firms which we 
constructed by combining data from various sources. Data on corporate governance, 
ownership structure, and financial performance of listed firms was collected from WIND 
and SinoFin databases.1 Data on export behaviour was collected from the Customs General 
Administration of China (CGAC).2 For our purpose, we matched manufacturing firms 
listed on China’s two stock exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen) with firms in the CGAC 
database by firm name, industry, and registration address.3 This exercise yielded an  
unbalanced panel of 2,647 firm-year observations for the period of 2002-2005, among 
which 1,379 (52%) were exporting observations.4 For the 779 manufacturing firms listed in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges at the end of 2005, 459 firms (58.9%) exported in 
at least one year during the period 2002-2005. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Prior studies on international diversification have recommended the use of multiple 
measures to improve validity (Sullivan 1994). Following this recommendation, we use both 
export propensity and export intensity as measures of the export behaviour of firms 
(Fernández/Nieto 2006, Zhao/Zou 2002). Export propensity indicates whether a firm is an 
exporter. Export intensity is the ratio of export sales to total sales, measuring export 
performance.  
 
Independent Variables 
 
We measure a firm’s corporate governance mechanisms with three variables. The first 
variable is CEO equity ownership which is measured as the percentage of the total equity of 
a firm that is owned by the CEO. This is commonly used in the literature to capture the 
extent to which management interests align with those of shareholders (Buck/Shahrim 2005, 
Eisenmann 2002, Sanders/Hambrick 2007, Wright et al. 2007). 
 
 The second variable is the independent director ratio, which has been used in the 
literature to investigate the effect of board structure on investment strategy (Kor 2006) and 
international diversification (Ellstrand et al. 2002, Tihanyi et al. 2003).5 The Board of 
Directors, at the apex of internal control systems, is charged with advising and monitoring 
management and has the responsibility to hire, fire, and compensate the senior management 
team (Jensen 1993). 
 
The third variable of corporate governance is ownership structure proxied by a 
private/family control dummy. Most prior studies of ownership structure have focused on 
immediate ownership - common shares directly owned by individuals or institutions. It has 
been noticed that immediate ownership is not sufficient for characterizing the ownership 
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and control structure of East Asian firms, as these firms are generally associated with 
complicated indirect ownership (Claessens et al. 2000, Fan et al. 2007). In this study, we 
use the newly available Private Listed Companies Database developed by the SinoFin 
Information Service to identify private/family controlled listed firms. A firm is 
private/family controlled if the largest ultimate owner of the listed firm is either a natural 
person or a private firm.  
 
To capture the institutional environment within which Chinese firms operate, we use 
the NERI marketisation index, which was developed by the National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI) to measure marketisation levels of Chinese provinces. The index 
summarizes the development status of market trading mechanisms and other institutions in 
achieving more efficient market functioning. NERI computes the index using data from the 
statistical yearbooks, reports from the administration of industry and commerce, and 
surveys. A score is assigned to each province based on several objective measures such as 
the ratio of lawyers or the ratio of accountants to the provincial population, which is 
normalized to a value between 0 and 10 in ascending order of marketisation levels.6 This 
index has been widely used in research (Chena et al. 2006, Li et al. 2006, Wen 2007).  
 
Control Variables 
 
We control for several other variables that may affect firm export behaviour. Prior 
studies have found that FDI in China (from OECD countries as well as Hong Kong, Macau, 
and Taiwan) brings in international knowledge (Buckley et al. 2002, Fernández/Nieto 2006), 
which may positively affect firm export propensity and intensity. To account for this effect, 
we use a variable called foreign investor participation, which is the percentage of shares of 
listed firms owned by foreigners.7 Prior studies have also found that overseas listing tends 
to make firms more oriented towards international markets. For example, Pagano et al. 
(2002) found that European companies become more export oriented after cross-listing in 
the United States. Chinese companies may issue H shares (traded on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange), N-shares (represented by American Depositary Receipts listed in New York), 
and shares in other overseas stock markets (Clarke 2006). To capture the export-enhancing 
effect of an overseas listing, we use a dummy variable which indicates whether a firm has 
an overseas listing. 
 
It is well known that China has a comparative advantage in labour. According to trade 
theory, China is expected to export goods whose labour intensity is high, or capital intensity 
is low. We use capital-labour ratio to measure capital intensity, which is computed as ratio 
of fixed assets to labor force. Recent trade literature emphasises the self-selection of firms 
to become exporters, implying that only firms with higher productivity can cover the fixed 
cost of exporting, and choose to export (Melitz 2003). To control for this self-selection 
effect, we use return on sales (ROS) as a measure of firm productivity.8 Following the 
literature (Filatotchev et al. 2001, Fernández/Nieto 2006), we also control for firm size 
measured by logarithm of the number of employees, and firm age measured by logarithm of 
the number of years since the establishment of the firm. 
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Methodology and Results 
 
Methods 
 
We test the hypotheses on export behaviour with two empirical models. In Model 1, 
we adopt a logit model to estimate the effects of hypothesised variables on the firm’s 
decision to be an exporter. In Model 2, we estimate a tobit model to analyze the 
determinants of export intensity. To deal with the possible reverse causation from the 
dependent variable to explanatory variables, we follow the same approach as existing 
studies, using regressors with a one-year lag (Filatotchev et al. 2001). We include industry 
and year fixed effects in the estimation to account for unobserved industry and 
time-specific effects. 
  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Variable inflation 
factors do not exceed two in any regressions, so the issue of multicollinearity between 
regressors is not a concern. On average, CEO equity ownership accounts for 0.27%, which 
is relatively low by international standards. However, the standard deviation of the variable 
is 2.3%, and the maximum value is 29%. The ratio of independent directors to the total 
number of board directors is 25% with a standard deviation of 13.58%. The correlations 
between the variables have the predicted signs, providing preliminary evidence supporting 
our hypotheses.  
 
Direct Effects 
 
Results for Model 1 and Model 2 are reported in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. 
Regression (1) of Table 2 reports the direct effects of corporate governance and institution 
variables on firm export propensity. First, we find that CEO equity ownership has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on firm export propensity. One percent increase of CEO 
equity ownership increases the probability of a firm becoming an exporter by 8.4% 
(=e0.0811-1). Thus, the marginal effect of CEO equity ownership on export orientation is 
significant, and H1a is supported.  
 
Second, we find that the estimated coefficient of independent director ratio is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. One percent increase of independent 
director ratio increases the probability of a firm becoming an exporter by 1.4 percent 
(=e0.0138-1). Hence, we have obtained evidence which is consistent with H1b.  
 
Third, we find that the private/family control dummy has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on firm export propensity. The estimated coefficient implies that 
private/family controlled firms are 43.9 percent (=e0.364-1) less likely to become exporters 
than state-controlled firms. We view this as evidence supporting H1c. 
 
Fourth, we find that the marketisation index, a measure of the institutional 
environment, has a positive and significant effect on firm export propensity. The estimated 
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coefficient indicates that if the marketisation index increases by one, the probability of a 
firm being an exporter increases by 14.1 percent (=e0.132-1). Thus, the result is in line with 
H2a. 
 
In Table 3, regression (5) reports the direct effects on firm export intensity. We find 
that both CEO equity ownership and independent director ratio have positive and 
statistically significant estimated coefficients, suggesting that they not only impact on the 
decision to become exporters, but also the decision of how much to export. However, we 
find that the private/family control dummy is statistically insignificant. This result indicates 
that private/family ownership affects export propensity rather than export intensity. We find 
that the marketisation index has a positive and significant effect on export intensity. Thus 
our results on export propensity and export intensity are consistent with each other, 
indicating that the corporate governance and institution variables directly impact the export 
behaviour of the sample firms.  
 
Moderated Effects 
 
Regressions (2)-(4) in Table 2 estimate the moderated effects of the independent 
variables on export propensity. In regression (2), CEO equity ownership and independent 
director ratio are moderated by the marketisation index. We find that the moderating effects 
by the marketisation index on both CEO equity ownership and independent director ratio 
are positive and significant. The results imply that corporate governance mechanisms, 
proxied by CEO equity ownership and independent director ratio, have a stronger effect on 
a firm’s decision to export in a well established institutional environment. In regression (3), 
CEO equity ownership and independent director ratio are moderated by the private/family 
control dummy. We find that the moderating effects of private/family control on CEO 
equity ownership and independent director ratio are positive, although the moderating 
effect on CEO equity ownership is statistically insignificant. Regression (4) includes all 
moderating effects. The results show that the effect of CEO equity ownership on export 
propensity increases with the marketisation index, while the effect of the independent 
director ratio on export propensity is higher in private/family controlled firms.  
 
Regressions (6)-(8) in Table 3 estimate the moderating effects of the independent 
variables on export intensity. Similar to the results on export propensity, all estimated 
moderating effects are positive, though some of them are statistically insignificant. Thus 
H1d and H2b are partially supported. Together these results highlight the important 
interactions between institutional environment and corporate governance, and between 
different dimensions of corporate governance, in shaping the export decisions and export 
performance of firms. 
 
Effects of Controls 
  
The estimated effects of control variables are mostly expected. First, we find that 
foreign investor participation makes a firm more likely to become an exporter (Table 2). 
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However, for a firm that has already exported, foreign investor participation does not raise 
its export intensity (Table 3). Second, we find that overseas listing not only makes a firm 
more likely to become an exporter (Table 2), but also raises its export intensity (Table 3). 
China has a comparative advantage in labour, hence firms producing labour-intensive goods 
(i.e., firms with lower capital intensities) are more likely to be exporters. This prediction is 
confirmed by negative and statistically significant estimated coefficients on capital labour 
ratio. Consistent with the newly emerging trade theory on the self selection of firms in 
exporting (Melitz 2003), we find that the estimated coefficients on return on sales are 
positive and statistically significant in export propensity regressions (Table 2), which 
indicates that firms with higher productivity (proxied by return on sales) are more likely to 
export. We find there is not a statistically significant correlation between return on sales and 
export intensity (Table 3), suggesting that firms with higher productivity do not necessarily 
engage more intensively in exporting. 
 
Interestingly, we find that firm size has a positive effect on export propensity (Table 2), 
but a negative effect on export intensity (Table 3). Larger firms have advantages in 
overcoming the fixed costs of exploring overseas markets, so they are more likely to 
become exporters. This prediction has received overwhelming support in the literature 
(Bonaccorsi 1992, Christensen et al. 1987). On the other hand, the literature offers mixed 
theoretical predictions and empirical evidence on the relationship between firm size and 
export intensity. A few studies report a negative relationship between firm size and export 
intensity (Patibandla 1995). Verwaal/Donkers (2002) argue that the relationship between 
firm size and export intensity is moderated by the export relationship size (measured by 
export transaction value per foreign buyer), so the correlation between firm size and export 
intensity can be either positive or negative depending on this moderating effect.  
 
Finally, we find that the estimated effect of firm age is negative. Some existing studies 
have found a positive effect of firm age on export propensity, and the main reason is that it 
is well-established firms who endure and survive long-term domestic competition and 
become exporters (Clerides, et al. 1998). This reasoning may not apply to Chinese firms 
since there has not been sufficient market competition, resulting in older and more efficient 
firms surviving as the more productive ones. On the contrary, it is the younger firms in 
China which have less historical burdens (such as employment burden for state-owned 
firms) who tend to be more risk-taking. Our result is also consistent with the recent 
literature on international new ventures or born globals which indicate that young and 
small/medium-size firms tend to be internationalised more rapidly in the new era of 
globalization (Almor 2006, Knight/Cavusgil 2004, Oviatt/McDougall 1994).      
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Export is an important step of internationalisation for firms from emerging economies 
(Pan/Tse 2000). Few studies, however, have examined the effect of corporate governance 
on export decisions in the context of emerging economies. In this paper, we consider 
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corporate governance factors as the main determinants of export strategies of Chinese listed 
firms. We adopt an integrated framework that combines the agency theory and the 
institutional theory. Within this framework, corporate governance interacts with the 
institutional environment within which the firm operates to affect the firm’s export 
strategies.   
 
We put corporate governance at the centre of our analysis, and examine the 
moderating effect of the institutional environment on corporate governance. We 
hypothesise that in a well-established institutional environment, and for private/family 
controlled firms, corporate governance has a stronger impact on firms’ internationalisation 
strategies. Firms are more likely to become exporters and export a higher proportion of 
their products with effective corporate governance. We test the hypotheses using a unique 
dataset of Chinese listed firms which was constructed by linking the data on corporate 
governance variables with the export transaction data. 
 
We focus on the export behaviour of Chinese firms during the period 2002-2005. 
China’s export policy changed gradually along with the process of its economic reforms. 
Before the economic reforms, only specially designated state agencies had the right to 
import and export. In the earlier stages of reform, the government managed exports through 
issuing export licences. After China joined WTO at the end of 2001, all firms were entitled 
to obtain direct export rights (Loo 2004).  
 
During the sample period, Chinese firms faced increasing challenges from 
international competition along with increasing opportunities to engage in 
internationalisation. Corporate governance has become a key management issue 
emphasized by the Chinese government. These changes have provided a unique opportunity 
to explore the effects of corporate governance on export decisions in connection with 
institutional changes in a large emerging economy.  
 
We find that the two key corporate governance variables, CEO equity ownership and 
independent director ratio, are positively associated with export decisions and export 
intensity, whereas private/family ownership negatively affects export decisions. The finding 
shows that corporate governance in Chinese listed firms plays an important role in 
internationalisation strategy. CEO compensation is an important mechanism through which 
risk-averse CEOs are motivated to make strategic decisions on behalf of shareholders. CEO 
equity ownership is only a recent phenomenon in China but it is an increasing trend, 
although CEO equity ownership is still relatively low by international standards. Our result 
on CEO equity ownership, which is quite similar to that in developed countries, provides 
evidence of the extent to which marketisation and corporate governance convergence 
between an emerging economy and the west has taken place (Buck et al. 2007). It may 
reflect the fact that market-oriented CEO compensation has induced CEOs’ loyalty, and 
hence their willingness to make risky and longer-term decisions such as exporting 
(Kato/Long 2006).  
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The variable of independent director ratio has a positive impact on export decisions and 
export intensity. The result may suggest that independent directors are likely to have 
favourable views on internationalisation strategy, hence positively influence export 
decisions because of their education and career background. A study based on a random 
sample of 500 listed Chinese companies found that 45% of independent directors in these 
companies were university professors or researchers from reputable research institutes (Yue 
2004). The finding implicitly indicates that the character of the independent directors, such 
as their international vision and experience, generates an export-promoting effect.  
 
The variable of private/family control is found to have a significantly negative 
association with export decisions, suggesting that private/family controlled firms are less 
likely to be exporters. The finding is consistent with those based on developed countries 
and newly industrialised economies (Fernández/Nieto 2006, Filatotchev et al. 2007). The 
result may indicate that private /family controlled firms are still in a relatively weak 
position and face resource and capability constraints. Hence, private/family ownership 
discourages internationalisation (Bai et al. 2006b).  
 
 The institutional environment is positively associated with exporting strategies. This 
result shows that a stronger institutional environment plays a supportive role in firms’ 
internationalisation. Conversely, a weaker institutional environment may constrain firms’ 
investment choices. We have further investigated the moderating effect of institutional 
factors and ownership structure on CEO equity ownership and independent directors. Our 
findings show that the effectiveness of the two corporate governance factors is moderated 
by the degree of marketisation and ownership structure. Specifically, we have found that the 
level of marketisation positively moderates the export-promoting effects of CEO equity 
ownership and independent directors. Private/family controlled firms also experience the 
larger export-promoting effects of improved corporate governance.  
 
 Our findings shed light on the interrelationship between corporate governance, 
institutional environments and exporting in the context of emerging economies. These 
findings show that the degree of marketisation and privatisation helps strengthen the effect 
of corporate governance on the internationalisation of local firms. The identification of 
crucial links between corporate governance, institutional environments and export 
behaviour has implications for government policy which aims to adopt the best practices of 
Western corporate governance in the emerging economy context. Our results suggest that 
corporate governance needs strong institutional support in order to increase its effectiveness. 
Hence, establishing effective and supportive institutional environments within different 
regions is a crucial task facing the governments in emerging economies. 
    
 We should acknowledge some limitations of the study. First, the study was limited to 
Chinese listed firms in manufacturing industries. Further research should be extended to 
other transition and emerging economies where marketisation and developing export 
promoting strategies are important features, but variations in governance regimes and 
institutional environments suggest scope for comparative, international analysis. Second, 
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our research is based on secondary data. The data availability constrained our measures for 
the character of corporate governance. For example, we have only measured and tested the 
impact of the proportion of independent directors. Future research should examine 
explicitly how the human capital and international experience of independent directors 
affect firms’ internationalisation strategies.    
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 WIND is a leading financial data vendor located in Shanghai, China. SinoFin Information Service is 
specialized in providing corporate governance data of Chinese listed firms. Corporate governance data from 
these two sources has been used in previous studies (Chang/Wong 2004, Kato/Long 2006). 
2 The CGAC data has an important advantage in that it exclusively covers all export records of Chinese 
exporting firms. This dataset allows us to construct measures for export propensity, export intensity and 
potentially other export characteristics of Chinese listed firms. 
3 This follows a recent trend in international trade research that links firm-level data with transaction- level 
trade data. Bernard, et al. (2007), Eaton, et al. (2004), and Eaton, et al. (2007) used such linked data to 
study export behaviour of firms in U.S., France, and Colombia, respectively. 
4 The CGAC data is available only for the period 2000-2005, so we focus on export behaviour of Chinese 
listed firms during the period. Manufacturing exports account for 93.5 percentage of China’s exports in 
2005 (Chinese Statistics Yearbook 2005), so we focus on listed firms from the manufacturing sector. 
5 According to the SinoFin data description, only individuals who do not have any occupation other than 
board director in the listed firm, and who have no such a kind of relationship with the listed firm that may 
affects these individuals’ subjective and independent judgments, are classified as independent directors. 
This is the definition of independent director used in Tian/Lau (2001). 
6 NERI (2002) provides a detailed description of the approach to construct the NERI index. 
7 Foreigners may buy B shares of Chinese listed companies. B shares are denominated in U.S. dollars in 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
8 It has been pointed out that there are problems with measuring firms’ assets in transitional economies 
(Filatotchev, et al. 2001), so we use ROS rather than ROA as a proxy for productivity. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
  MEAN STDV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Export propensity 0.52 0.49            
2 Export intensity 0.14 0.18 --           
3 CEO equity ownership 0.27 2.34 0.08*** 0.12***         
4 Independent director ratio 25.15 13.58 0.05*** 0.03  0.08***        
5 Marketisation index 6.67 1.83 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.13***       
6 Private/family control dummy 0.17 0.38 -0.06*** 0.02  0.20*** 0.17*** 0.10***      
7 Foreign investor participation 0.06 0.25 0.08*** 0.06** -0.01  0.02  0.15*** 0.03       
8 Overseas listing 0.02 0.15 0.10*** 0.03  -0.02  -0.03  0.04** -0.05*** -0.04***    
9 Capital labour ratio 0.37 1.43 -0.06*** 0.00  -0.02  0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02  0.07*** -0.01     
10 Return on sales 0.22 0.15 0.02  0.04  0.09*** -0.01  -0.11*** 0.14*** 0.03  -0.01  0.04**   
11 Firm size 7.59 1.04 0.09*** -0.05  -0.07*** -0.03  -0.03  -0.18*** -0.08*** 0.22*** -0.31*** -0.13*** 
12 Firm age 2.02  0.43 -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.07*** -0.12*** 0.08*** 0.07*** -0.10*** 0.01 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients are reported; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05. 
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Table 2. Regression Results on Export Propensity 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Direct Effects     
CEO equity ownership 0.0811*** 0.0211 0.0710** 0.0282 
 (0.029) (0.044) (0.032) (0.046) 
Independent director ratio 0.0138** 0.0138** 0.0138** 0.0140** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Private/family control -0.364*** -0.405*** -0.374*** -0.414*** 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) 
Marketisation index 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Moderated Effects     
(CEO equity ownership  
× Private/family control)/100  
14.30 
(9.22)  
10.30 
(8.01) 
     
(Independent director ratio  
× Private/family control)/100  
3.18** 
(1.52)  
2.93* 
(1.50) 
     
(CEO equity ownership 
× Marketisation index)/100   
0.755* 
(0.440) 
0.898* 
(0.450) 
     
(Independent director ratio  
× Marketisation index)/100   
0.078* 
(0.041) 
0.069 
(0.053) 
     
Effects of Controls     
Foreign investor participation 0.618*** 0.626*** 0.620*** 0.628*** 
 (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) 
Overseas listing 1.498*** 1.440*** 1.461*** 1.413*** 
 (0.330) (0.330) (0.330) (0.330) 
Capital labour ratio -0.130* -0.129* -0.130* -0.128* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Return on sales 0.740** 0.729** 0.713** 0.693** 
 (0.340) (0.340) (0.340) (0.340) 
Firm size 0.174*** 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.170*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Firm age -0.493*** -0.483*** -0.494*** -0.485*** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) 
     
Observations 2632 2632 2632 2632 
2χ  295.61 303.11 303.28 309.17 
Log likelihood -1673.91 -1670.161 -1670.07 -1667.13 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0811 0.0832 0.0832 0.0849 
Notes: Estimation uses a logit model. All regressions include industry and year dummies. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Regression Results on Export Intensity 
 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Direct Effects     
CEO equity ownership 0.004** -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Independent director ratio 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Private/family control -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Marketisation index 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Moderated Effects     
(CEO equity ownership  
× Private/family control)/100  
0.733*** 
(0.270)  
0.662** 
(0.320) 
     
(Independent director ratio  
× Private/family control)/100  
0.0542 
(0.110)  
0.021 
(0.110) 
     
(CEO equity ownership 
× Marketisation index)/100   
0.027* 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.015) 
     
(Independent director ratio  
× Marketisation index)/100   
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
     
Effects of Controls     
Foreign investor participation 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Overseas listing 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Capital labour ratio -0.024* -0.025* -0.024* -0.025* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Return on sales -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.021 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Firm size -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Firm age -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
     
Observations 1375 1375 1375 1375 
2χ  221.45 229.17 226.9 231.19 
Log likelihood -476.58 -480.44 -479.31 -481.45 
Notes: Estimation uses a tobit model. All regressions include industry and year dummies. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
